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Abstract: We evaluate the impact of a price cap regulation implemented
in the Colombian pharmaceutical market between 2011 and 2014. To do so,
we take advantage of a unique data set where we observe three sources of
variation: i) differences across eighteen groups in the Anatomical Therapeu-
tic Chemical (ATC) classification system of the WHO, ii) the existence of
regulated (treated) and unregulated (control) groups within each of these
eighteen ATC groups, and iii) differences in time (before and after regula-
tion) for the eighteen ATC groups. A triple differences model with fixed time
effects and cluster errors is used to identify the impact of this regulation. We
find that the price-cap regulation contributed to reduce prices in three of
the eighteen groups and increase average prices for ten of them. We confirm
then that the focal point effect generated by a price-cap regulation can gen-
erate unintended distortions. More specifically, our results reveal that the
implementation of this price cap regulation potentially increased -public and
private- expenditure by 30%, only for the 2,422 drugs in the eighteen ATC
groups we study.
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1 Introduction
The study of pharmaceutical markets has been of particular interest to pol-
icymakers over the world, largely because of the growing participation of
medicine expenses in the total expenditure of health systems during the two
last decades.4 In addition, the pharmaceutical sector is characterised by
firms with an important market power due to the intellectual property pro-
tection. Even though on-patent medicines are not necessarily in a monopoly
position since they may compete with me-too drugs that belong to the same
therapeutic class (according to the regulation at work), most therapeutic
classes are far from being competitive (Bardey et al., 2016a). On the other
hand, health insurance coverage makes policyholders quite insensitive to drug
prices, yielding the so-called ex post moral hazard. Thus, this combination of
market power on the supply side and health care demand inelasticity usually
justifies regulations on both the demand and supply sides.
In such a context, policymakers usually use two types of instruments: out-
of-pockets on the patients’ side to reduce ex post moral hazard behaviours and
drugs’ price regulation to limit inefficiency coming from firms’ market power.
However, as pointed out in Bardey et al. (2016b) out-of-pocket schemes,
while reducing ex post moral hazard may also be useful to reduce firms’
market power on the supply side.5 Consequently, the interplay between both
regulations may complicate the impact evaluations of drugs’ price regulations.
Out-of-pocket schemes, while lowering inefficiencies caused by ex post
moral hazard, may also create problems of health care access (Nyman, 1999).
Even though health care access is an important issue everywhere, it tends to
be stronger in developing countries that are usually characterised by higher
level of inequalities. It may be the reason why some developing countries
limit the use out-of-pocket schemes and focus on regulations that limit mar-
ket power on the supply side. For instance, in countries like Colombia that
4See OECD report in 2016.
5Bardey et al. (2016b) show that an out-of-pocket payment scheme that combines in
an adequate way an ad valorem coinsurance rate and a specific (per unit) copayment can
effectively control laboratories’ prices, which is then set so that their revenue just covers
fixed costs. Therefore, a suitable regulation of the copayment instruments leads to the
same reimbursement rule as in under perfect competition for medical products and is able
to eliminate laboratories’ market power.
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has achieved an almost universal coverage and where the healthcare is con-
sidered as a fundamental civil right, patients actually pay a relatively small
share of the price of healthcare services and interventions, making the de-
mand for drugs inelastic. Thus, it creates a favourable environment to eval-
uate the impact of medicines price-cap regulation since the interplay with
the demand-side is almost nonexistent. Moreover, as the Colombian drugs’
market was pretty deregulated since 2006, it eliminates de facto interactions
with previous regulations.
This deregulation policy agenda yielded to the result that in 2009 Colom-
bia had the most expensive medicines in the region (Health Action Interna-
tional, 2009).6 In order to reduce general drug prices, the Colombian govern-
ment responded by implementing two price cap regulation instruments. The
first mechanism was the Maximum Recovery Value scheme (VMR in Span-
ish, Valor Máximo de Recobro), which applied only to medicines that were
not covered by the social health insurance system’s benefits plan, but which
were available and usually free of out-of-pocket expenses through a commonly
used lawsuit mechanism. The second price cap instrument was the Maximum
Price for Sale to the Public (Precio Máximo de Venta al Público or PMVP),
which sets a maximum price for specific medicines that are covered by the
benefits plan. Both regulations aimed at limiting laboratories’ market power
by decreasing their price fixing leeway.
In this research, we develop an empirical strategy that allows for an eval-
uation of the impact of the second regulation instrument (i.e., the PMVP) on
average prices and the consequent pharmaceutical expenditure, for a sample
of drugs in Colombia. We focus on eighteen groups of drugs defined by the
World Health Organization’s ATC classification. These particular 18 groups
contain a total of 2,422 pharmaceutical products. This impact evaluation
takes advantage of the way the price cap scheme was implemented: drug
prices were regulated individually, not by ATC group. Since drugs belong-
ing to the same ATC group are comparable by definition, we find a natural
reference group of drugs within the same ATC, and thus have a counter-
6For instance, a comparison with a sample of 93 countries reveals that Ciprofloxacine
-an off patent antibiotic used to treat different kinds of infections- costed US$131 in Colom-
bia, while its cost in China was about US$31 (in the same period). More generally, the
Colombian Health Ministry has pointed out that, from a list of 59 high-demand drugs, 55
were found to be more expensive in the country than in Spain.
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factual to identify the causal effect of the price regulation ex post. Thanks
to information provided by the System of Information for Medicine Prices
(SISMED in Spanish), this study has access to a longitudinal database of
monthly reports on a set of characteristics for each pharmaceutical product
(including the sale price) over a period of four years (2011 to 2014). This
rich database allows us to develop a model of triple differences with fixed
effects at the time period and individual drug levels.
Our results reveal that, in the aggregate, the regulation had an unex-
pected impact on regulated drugs in the eighteen ATC groups included in
our analysis. Specifically, we find that the PMVP price-cap scheme reduced
average prices for regulated drugs in only three of the eighteen ATC groups,
with reductions ranging between -10% and -87%. However, the same regu-
latory instrument increased average prices of regulated drugs in ten of the
eighteen ATC groups. These increases range between 15% and 91%.7 We
also study the consequences of this regulation in terms of the system’s phar-
maceutical expenditure. This calculation is made based on the expenditures
registered on November 2012, the last month in which none of the drugs
taken into account in the study were regulated. For this month, we point
out that, in the aggregate, regulation led to an average increase of 30% in
the expenditure in these eighteen ATC groups.
In the existing literature there is not a definitive, unique and unambigu-
ous conclusion about the effects of price regulation schemes, given that it
depends completely on the method for fixing the specific price caps and the
institutional context in which they are implemented. A first obvious effect of
a scheme like the PMVP is that drug prices should decrease under the cap,
specially brand-name products that usually have an important positive price
margin. Nevertheless, a second -and less obvious- effect is that this regulation
may generate a convergence in the prices of medicines towards the imposed
ceilings (Danzon and Liu, 1996). In his literature review, Puig-Junoy (2010)
reveals that the application of price cap regulation is generally associated
with an increase in the price of generic (as opposed to brand-name) phar-
maceuticals. Therefore, the reduction in prices of brand-name drugs and
the increase in generics leads to an uncertain net effect. In our estimation,
for some therapeutic classes, we interpret that the average increase in drug
7Our results do not indicate significant effects for the other five ATC groups.
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prices is likely to be due to this “focal point” effect.8
The second section describes the recent behaviour of the market for
medicines in Colombia and briefly presents the relevant regulatory frame-
work. In the third section, we present the causal identification strategy and
the estimated econometric model. In the fourth section, the sources of infor-
mation and data are presented. Finally, in sections 5 we discuss the results
obtained and we conclude in section 6.
2 The pharmaceutical market in Colombia
In Colombia, the health system operates under a Managed Care Competition
scheme, which aims at controlling healthcare costs and expenditures, by pro-
moting quality competition among private and public insurers. This social
insurance system, introduced in 1993 through the emblematic Ley 100, has
successfully achieved an almost universal health insurance coverage in the
country (reaching 95% in 2018, compared to 29% in 1995). Under this insur-
ance scheme, a standardized benefit package is established, which includes
preventive attention, medical-surgical care and essential drugs. Evidently,
the improvement in the system’s coverage resulted in an increase in the sup-
ply of medicines. In 2011, total expenditure on medicines amounted to 3,844
million US dollars, which corresponded to 16.5% of total health system ex-
penditure for the country in that year (Afidro, 2012).
More importantly, in 2009 Colombia had the unflattering title of being
the country in the region with the highest average pharmaceutical prices
(Health Action International, 2009). For this reason, the Ministry of Health
and Social Protection (MSPS in Spanish) and the National Commission for
Medicine Prices (CNPM in Spanish) decided to reintroduce price regulation
8An important part of the existing literature focuses on the effects of regulation on
competition. Specifically, several studies aim at understanding the impact of regulatory
schemes on the entry of generics into the medicines market (see Aronsson et al., 2001;
Dalen et al., 2006; Brekke et al., 2011; Brekke et al., 2015). Our results depend on the
market structure within the therapeutic classes considered. Thus, we believe our results
suggest that that the price-cap impact depends on the level of competition varies within
ATC groups. However, the time period of our study does not allow us to investigate in
depth the dynamics of market structures.
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for this market. We present in the the appendix a timeline documenting the
most important changes in the recent Colombian normative framework. In
the year 2010, prices caps (called VMR) were introduced only for a group of
drugs that were excluded from the standardized benefits plan. In 2013, an-
other price cap scheme was implemented (PMVP) for the 863 drugs included
in the benefits plan (across all ATC groups). More precisely, the prices were
regulated at the wholesalers’ level. In particular, it was said that a specific
product market would be regulated when any of the following two character-
istics were present: (1) less than three bidders, or (2) a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) greater than 2,500.
For regulated ATC, the International Reference Price (PRI in Spanish)
was applied, taking the price to the 25th percentile in the price list of the 17
countries used for reference. When the national price reference was greater
than its international equivalent, the market was regulated by equalizing
these prices. Otherwise, the regulation did not apply. It should be noted
that this regulation was carried out at the product level and associated with a
Unique Medication Code, instead of regulating by ATC group (which includes
direct substitutes in terms of the organ or system on which they act and their
therapeutic, pharmacological and chemical properties). As we explain below,
this point is crucial for our identification strategy, and may also explain some
of the results we obtain.
3 Identification strategy
Every impact evaluation has the essential challenge of selecting a control
group that serves as a counter-factual to identify and quantify, without a
bias, the attributable treatment effect. To this extent, the identification
strategy that we propose is not only based on the comparison of average
prices before and after the implementation of the PMVP regulation (that
is, before and after ”treatment”), but also contrasting drugs subject to the
price cap scheme (i.e., the treatment group) and comparable drugs that
were not regulated (i.e. the control group). Specifically, we take advantage
of three sources of variation to identify the causal effect of this regulation
scheme on the market. The first variation comes from the available panel
data structure: drug prices and quantities are observed over time and, more
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importantly, under different regulatory regimes. Thus, our empirical strategy
exploits variation of prices over time, before and after the implementation
of the price cap regulation. The second source of variation we observe and
exploit comes from the (non-random) assignment of complete ATC groups
to treatment. In this case, our empirical strategy takes advantage of the fact
that not all ATC groups were regulated, throughout the period of analysis
(i.e., assignment varied across ATC groups). Finally, the third and most
important source of variation is the (non-random) assignment to treatment
of specific drugs, within a ATC groups.
As mentioned before, the ATC taxonomy identifies the chemical struc-
ture of pharmacological substances and drugs, the system or organ on which
it acts, its pharmacological effect and the therapeutically relevant indica-
tions. The first level in this taxonomy –identified by a letter and comprising
fourteen subgroups– shows the organ or system on which the medicine acts.
Table 1 describes the anatomical level of the classification system. The next
classification level, given by a two-digit number, identifies the therapeutic
subgroup. The third and fourth levels (two consecutive letters) identify the
chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic subgroups of the drug. The fifth
level of the ATC code establishes the chemical substance (again a two-digit
number).
It is important to underline again the fact that the ATC classification
system groups drugs according to the main therapeutic use of its active in-
gredient to treat a distinct organ. In other words, ATC codes group pharma-
ceutical substances according to the expected effect that a specific chemical
has in the treatment of a specific disease, on a specific body part or system.
To this extent, a drug can be assigned to more than one ATC codes, if it is
available in the market in more than one forms of administration, which de-
fine different intensities of treatment for different organs.9 Therefore, ATC
codes provide a clear cut definition of comparable medicines.10 Our iden-
9For example, this happens in the case of sexual hormones. With some specific doses,
such hormones are used against cancer and are classified under the L02 code, which cor-
responds to endocrinian therapy. Exactly same pharmaceutical substance (sexual hor-
mones), with another dosage, is used to modulate genital systems and belongs to group
G03. In other words, the same active principle can be associated to different ATC codes,
given that it has different uses and dosage.
10This ATC classification -provided by the WHO- has been used by several groups of
authors that aim to assess different drugs regulations schemes. See for instance: Brekke et
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Table 1: Organ or system on which the drug operates (Anatomical Level)
Letters System or organ
A Digestive system and metabolism
B Blood and hematopoietic organs
C Cardiovascular system
D Dermatologic medications
G Genitourinary system and sex hormones
H Systemic hormonal preparations and sexual hormones
J Anti-infectives in general for systemic use
L Anti-neoplastic and immuno-modulatory agents
M Musculo-skeletal system
N Nervous system
P Anti-parasitic products, insecticides and repellents
R Respiratory system
S Organs of the senses
V Various
Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization. See: https://www.
whocc.no/atc/structure_and_principles/
tification strategy capitalizes this by comparing regulated and unregulated
drugs within an ATC code, after accounting for particular characteristics at
the individual substance level.11
We include in our analysis eighteen ATC groups, which were selected
following three criteria. First, that the ATC group contained unregulated
(control) and regulated (treatment) drugs. Second, that the ATC groups
contained more than twenty medicines.12 This second criteria was included
in order to have large enough groups so that we could assume the usual sta-
al. (2007), Brekke et al. (2011); Brekke et al. (2015); Dalen et al. (2006) y Kaiser et al.
(2013). Moreover, countries such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland and
France use this ATC classification (up to level 5) to pool together drugs and set reference
prices.
11As mentioned before, drugs registered under the same ATC code differentiate them-
selves given specific characteristics, such as the company that produces it and whether
they are generic or branded-name drugs.
12Only one of the selected groups contains less than thirty drugs. We decide to include
it in order to enhance statistical power in our estimations.
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tistical properties and sampling distributions for our regression coefficients.
Finally, we select ATC groups that have drugs before and after the imple-
mentation of the price-cap regulation.
4 Econometric model
To achieve an adequate control group definition that minimizes possible bi-
ases in our estimates, we use a triple-differences econometric model. Specif-
ically, this empirical model exploits: (i) differences in time, (ii) differences
across ATC groups, and (iii) differences within ATC groups. In addition,
this model includes time fixed effects to control for period specific differ-
ences that are common to all markets and affect average prices (see Pavnick,
2002).13 Finally, cluster errors (at the ATC group level) are included in the
model, taking into account that unobserved variables may affect ATC groups
differently and generate heterogeneous error distributions.14
The regression model to be estimated for drug i, belonging to ATC group
j, in period t, is given by the following equation:










+Xijtα + Θt + εijt,
(1)
where ln(Pijt) is the natural logarithm for the price of drug i, belonging to
ATC group j, in period t.15 In this estimation, the variation of the drug
price is explained by the binary variable of treatment Di that takes the value
of 1 when the drug is regulated by the PMVP (that is, it is part of the
treatment group); the binary variable Tit, which takes the value of 1 if t > T̄ ,
T̄ being the period in which the price-cap scheme starts for drug i; the binary
13These time fixed effects are included to capture the variability of macroeconomic
variables, such as price inflation and economic cycles.
14We use standard errors clusters anticipating that maybe the independence assumption
is not satisfied. In other words, we do not assume away heterocedascity since there is a
strong correlation within ATC groups and some no observable variables may vary within
ATC groups. Thus, we may expect that the errors’ distribution vary across ATC groups.
15As usual, we use the natural logarithm of the price in order to interpret our coefficients
as a semi-elasticity.
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treatment variable Gj, which takes the value of 1 when the drug is part of
ATC group j; the vector of control variables Xijt; and the fixed time effects
Thetat. In this way, β4j, β5j, β6j and β7j are vectors with 18 parameters, one
per ATC group.
Three assumptions must be satisfied to ensure that the estimation is
correctly specified. First, drugs’ fixed effects must be correlated with the
stochastic error of the equation (see equation 2). This implies that the varia-
tion in drugs’ prices must be partially explained by unobserved variables that
do not vary over time but are contained in the error term εijt. Formally:
Corr(γi, εijt) 6= 0. (2)
Second, the treatment indicator Di must not be correlated with the stochastic
error (equation 3). Being a natural experiment, assignment to treatment is
given by the assignment to the regulation scheme at the drugs’ level (and
at the ATC level). Since this is not a random process, it is possible that,
although exogenous, the treatment assignment is not perfect in the sense
that in the assignment process systematic differences are generated between
the treatment and control groups. Therefore, the variables that explain these
systematic differences must be included in the econometric model to correct
the potential selection bias that generates such non-probabilistic assignment.
Hence, in our estimation we include a vector of observable variables to control
for pre-existing differences, especially with regard to characteristics that vary
in time.
Corr(Di, εijt) = 0. (3)
Finally, variables contained in Xijt must not be correlated with the error
term (equation 4); as well as the time effects (equation 5). That is, the
observable variables, which explain the pre-existing differences to treatment
(contained in Xijt), must not be correlated with non-observable variables
contained in the error εijt. Furthermore, the fixed time effects (which control
for the period-specific variation that affect the outcome variable) must not
be correlated with the error term. This assumption is necessary because
a correlation different to zero would indicate that unobserved time-varying
variables still explain variations in price, which would generate a bias in
treatment effect estimates.
Corr(Xijt, εijt) = 0, (4)
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Corr(Θt, εijt) = 0. (5)
In this impact evaluation we aim to identify the average impact of the
regulation on regulated drug prices. Ideally, this average impact corresponds
to the difference between average of prices in the group of regulated drugs and
the theoretical average prices of the same drugs if the price-cap regulation
would not had been implemented. We use as empirical counter-factual a
group of non-regulated drugs that belong to the same ATC groups, which we
believe to be comparable to the treated drugs. When estimating the triple
differences model we implicitly seek to simultaneously obtain the 18 partial
derivatives presented in equation 6 (one for each of the 18 ATC groups):
∂ ln(PiJt)
∂GJ
= β4JGJ + β5JTitGJ + β6JDiGJ + β7JTitDiGJ. (6)
For example, the effect of the change in prices for ATC group J is given
by the derivative of ln(Pijt) when GJ = 1 and Gj = 0 for all j 6= J . Upon
replacing GJ = 1, we obtain:
∂ ln(PiJt)
∂GJ
= β4J + β5JTit + β6JDi + β7JTitDi. (7)
From equation 7, we obtain four equations that explain the behavior of the
treatment (Di = 1) and control (Di = 0) groups, before (Tit = 1) and after
(Tit = 0) the start of the price-cap regulation implementation, inside of ATC
group J . Average prices for regulated and unregulated drugs in ATC group
J in different scenarios are represented by the following equations: regulated
drugs after regulation (equation 8), regulated before regulation (equation




(Di = 1, Tit = 1) = β4J + β5J + β6J + β7J (8)
∂ ln(PiJt)
∂GJ




(Di = 0, Tit = 1) = β4J + β5J (10)
∂ ln(PiJt)
∂GJ
(Di = 0, Tit = 0) = β4J (11)
Given this, changes in average prices for regulated drugs (treated) in ATC
group J can be obtained by subtracting equation 9 from equation 8. Simi-
larly, the result of subtracting equation 11 from equation 10 corresponds to
the change in non-regulated (control) drugs before and after the implemen-
tation of the price-cap regulation, in ATC group J . Thus, the impact of
regulation on ATC group J is expressed by the difference between these two
differences, represented in this model by parameter β7J . In conclusion, the
parameters of interest are contained in vector ~β7 = [β7,1, · · · , β7,18], which
measures the average effect on prices due to the implementation of the price-
cap regulation, in each of the 18 ATC groups.
5 Data
The main data source is the Medicine Prices Information System (SISMED),
a database consolidated and managed by the Colombian Ministry of Health
and Social Protection (MSPS). This database systematizes information re-
garding all medicines marketed nationwide, including: sales prices, units sold,
CUM code, ATC group code, whether the medicine is included in the social
health insurance benefits plan, among other variables. This database is built
from the mandatory reports generated by all institutions in the social protec-
tion system that purchase or sell pharmaceuticals.16 Although there is a legal
mandate to report this information, sub-reporting remains to be relatively
16These institutions are: Local Health Directorates (DTS in Spanish - Direcciones Ter-
ritoriales de Salud), Health Maintenance Organizations (EPS in Spanish - Empresas Pro-
motoras de Salud), Health Service Providing Organizations (IPS in Spanish - Instituciones
Prestadoras de Servicios de Salud), Family Welfare Organizations (CCF in Spanish - Ca-
jas de Compensación Familiar) and pharmaceutical companies. These institutions have
to report prices according to official regulatory decrees (Circular 1 and 4 of 2004 and 2006,
respectively). Reports are generated each trimester and must include the total value of
drug purchases and sales, quantities, maximum and minimum prices, for the most specific
ATC group code.
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high in Colombia (IADB, 2011). Thus, it is important to briefly address how
self-reporting may compromise the quality of this self-reported data. All
agents have incentives to act strategically under the potential risk of being
regulated by the State thanks to the information provided. For instance,
a private organization may have strong incentives to misreport price data
when this information could trigger a price-cap scheme. We believe these in-
centives potentially generate biases on the impact estimates of the price-cap
regulation only if regulated drug prices are systematically misreported or, if
only unregulated drug prices are misreported. However, if all prices are mis-
reported in the same proportion (regardless of the drug’s regulatory status),
and thus measurement error is homogeneous across treatment and control
groups, then impact estimates -i.e. average price changes attributable to the
regulation- should be unbiased.
According to the MSPS, data in the the SISMED is consistent and com-
parable across time since 2010. Fortunately, this data restriction does not
limit our capacity evaluate the impact of the PMVP scheme, given that it
is possible to compare price changes before and after the implementation of
the regulation, for both treatment and control groups. However, not having
price data series before 2010 limits our ability to analyze the trends during
the pre-regulation periods.
Additionally, an original database was built using official regulatory de-
crees that report the precise periods in which all pharmaceutical products
were subject to the PMVP scheme. This data set defines variable Di, which
takes a value equal to 1 when drug i (defined by a specific CUM code) is
regulated during the period 2011-2014 (and 0 otherwise); and variable Tit,
which is equal to 1 if drug i is regulated during month t. Also, using this
source of information, a binary variable was constructed to classify all drugs
between generic (equal to 0) or brand-name (equal to 1).17
The final analytical data set is an unbalanced panel due to missing ob-
servations caused by the fact that drugs enter the market at different times.
Indeed, it has been documented that, in many cases, regulation itself alters
market entry rates (Bardey et al., 2010 and 2016). The database is built at
the most specific CUM code level available and contains a total of 48 periods,
17This variable was constructed following the following rule: whenever the name of the
pharmaceutical corresponds to its active principle, it is assumed that it is a generic drug.
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corresponding to the months in a 4 year period (2011 to 2014).
As explained above, the impact evaluation study includes only 18 ATC
groups and 2,422 drugs, which correspond to 2.13% of the total drugs reg-
istered.18 The selected 18 ATC groups satisfy three criteria: (i) all include
treatment and control drugs (at least 1 of each), (ii) all contain more than 20
drugs (in total), and (iii) all have observations for pre- and post-regulation
periods. The decision to use a threshold of 20 drugs is grounded on the fact
that, when relaxing of this requirement, an insignificant number of drugs or
ATC groups were included in the analysis. Table 2 shows how, as the mini-
mum drugs per ATC requirement changes, the total number of ATC groups
and drugs included in the study changes.19
Table 2: Minimum required number of drugs by ATC, and corresponding
number of ATC groups and drugs included in the study








The proposed empirical strategy assumes that, within ATC groups, regu-
lated (treatment) and unregulated drugs (control) are comparable given that
they have the same therapeutic use, and exhibit the same chemical com-
position. Nevertheless, we observe differences in the average price for the
treatment and control drugs, during the periods prior to treatment (i.e., be-
fore the implementation of the price-cap regulation). Table 3 presents the
18In Colombia, in December 2015, there were a total of 113,727 registered drugs classified
into 1,238 ATC groups. From these 1,238 ATC groups, only 46 had regulated drugs. These
46 ATC groups included 2,714 drugs.
19As a robustness check, we ran the estimation with all of the 46 ATC groups that have
drugs in control and treatment groups, that include 2714 drugs. Our results do not vary,
but we are concerned about our prediction capacity within the ATC groups that have a
small number of drugs.
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results for the statistical tests evaluating the statistical significance of mean
differences in the the natural logarithm of sale prices of regulated versus non-
regulated drugs, by ATC group. Results show that, for most ATC groups,
there is a statistically significant difference in the trend of sale prices, before
treatment. These differences can be explained by two main reasons. First,
because of the different level of competition presented within each of the ATC
groups. In particular, competition is lower for non-regulated drugs. Second,
because there are more brand-name drugs in the treatment group than in the
control group, and it is known that generic drugs have systematically lower
prices.
Table 3: Test of difference in average ln(prices)
ATC codes Before the regulation After the regulation
1 A02BC05 -0,28*** 0,65***
2 A10AE04 0,05*** 0,10**
3 B02BD02 -0,95*** -0,43**
4 H02AB04 0,02 0,19***
5 J01DH02 0,28*** 0,04**
6 J01XX08 0,93*** -0,91***
7 L01AX03 0,66** 0,22*
8 L01BC06 -0,50 0,74***
9 L02BB03 1,06*** 0,18*
10 L03AB07 -0,94*** 0,10
11 L04AA06 0,43*** 0,39***
12 L04AD01 0,82*** 0,93***
13 L04AD02 1,41*** 0,99***
14 N03AX14 0,47*** 0,60***
15 N03AX16 0,44 0,05
16 N04BC05 -0,62*** -0,08
17 N05AH04 0,53*** 0,40***
18 N06DA03 1,57*** 0,41***
Source: Author estimates using data from SISMED.
Figure 1 gives an idea of the general behavior of prices in the periods in-
cluded in the study.20 When interpreting this descriptive figure, it is impor-
20It is important to acknowledge that this figure must be interpreted cautiously, since it
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tant to note that most of the drugs that have entered the price-cap regulation
were regulated in the year 2013.21 According to Figure 1, at the beginning of
the price-cap regulation implementation, there is a general price reduction,
but then the difference between the two groups increases.
Figure 1: Average prices for regulated and unregulated drugs
An important assumption when identifying the impact of the price-cap
regulation in our empirical strategy is that price trends for regulated and
non-regulated medicines are parallel during the period prior to regulation,
after controlling for observable characteristics at the drug and ATC group
levels. To this extent, it must be stressed that the trends presented in Fig-
ure 1 do not control for the observable drugs’ characteristics. For example,
within treatment and control groups there may be proportionally more or
less generic drugs. Similarly, the distribution of drugs may be different for
each sample at the ATC group level. Hence, to control for pre-existing dif-
ferences, we include time and drug-specific fixed effects, in addition to three
important control variables.
compares unregulated and regulated drugs without controlling by specific characteristics
at the ATC group level.
21On average, the ”treatment” duration was 11 months.
16
The first control variable is the the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
which measures market share concentration and that is a good proxy of the
level of competition.22 Table 4 presents the estimated HHI for each ATC
group, in years 2011 and 2014 (columns 7 and 8). The results indicate that
the HHI contains two important types of variation: between ATC groups
and over time (within the same ATC).
The second control variable is a dichotomous variable that indicates if
the drug is brand-name or generic. According to the literature, the effect of
regulations can be different in this dimension. One could expect a relatively
larger number of brand-name drugs within the treatment group, since these
usually have greater mark-ups and thus higher sale prices. This explains,
at least partially, the difference in price trends between the two groups (see
Figure 1). Table 4 shows the total number of drugs in each ATC group (n in
column 2), the proportion of brand-name drugs (BN/n; column 3), the pro-
portion of regulated drugs (Reg/n; column 4), the proportion of brand-name
drugs over the total number of regulated drugs (BN/Reg; column 5); and
the proportion of brand-name drugs in the non-regulated total (BN/UnReg;
column 6). Evidently, there is an important variation in these proportions
across ATC groups. Only in 3 of the 18 ATC groups, brand-name drugs
represent less than 70%. Additionally, the proportion of regulated drugs
varies importantly, ranging from a minimum of 1% for ATC A02BC05 and
a maximum of 70% for ATC L03AB07. On the contrary, for almost all ATC
groups, brand-name drugs are always regulated: in only 4 of the 18 ATC
groups the percentage of brand-name drugs included in the regulation fall
below 100%. Evidently, it is important to include in the estimation the type
of drug (brand-name versus generic) to capture this heterogeneity across
groups.
Finally, the model includes the nominal exchange rate between the Colom-
bian peso and the US Dollar as a control variable. This variable is included
to take into account the effect exchange rate volatility has on international
pharmaceutical markets, given that many of the drugs marketed within the
country are imported. Furthermore, many other pharmaceutical products
sold in the Colombian market, despite being produced within the national
territory, use imported inputs. To this extent, we may expect that the be-
22The HHI ranges between 0 and 10,000, where 10,000 indicates a monopolistic structure
in the market.
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havior of the exchange rate explains part of the variation in prices in the
Colombian drugs’ market.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by ATC
ATC n BN/n Reg/n BN/Reg BN/UnReg HHI HHI
(%) (%) (%) (%) 2011 2014
1 A02BC05 654 78 1 100 78 66 402
2 A10AE04 40 100 63 100 100 10000 9988
3 B02BD02 86 83 7 33 86 9780 1994
4 H02AB04 107 61 5 100 59 709 1135
5 J01DH02 181 30 15 100 18 4 1198
6 J01XX08 48 77 42 45 100 1 70
7 L01AX03 43 93 53 100 85 10000 9428
8 L01BC06 25 92 16 100 90 10000 5879
9 L02BB03 74 91 47 100 82 4006 3296
10 L03AB07 20 100 70 100 100 4764 5162
11 L04AA06 62 100 8 100 100 5542 2592
12 L04AD01 47 89 19 100 87 5282 5467
13 L04AD02 43 63 44 58 67 7456 7080
14 N03AX14 187 95 3 100 95 1163 2094
15 N03AX16 259 80 22 100 75 0 73
16 N04BC05 48 73 58 100 35 2067 9685
17 N05AH04 418 71 38 75 68 3570 1999
18 N06DA03 80 100 58 100 100 9997 9998
Total 2422
Source: SISMED 2011-2014. Author’s calculations.
Notes: Reg=Total number of regulated drugs, UnReg=Total number of unreg-
ulated drugs, BN=Total number of brand-name, G=total number of generic,
n=Total number of drugs. HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
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6 Results
Before presenting the results of the main econometric model, we briefly dis-
cuss two statistical tests that assess the validity of the empirically verifiable
assumptions supporting our methodological approach. On the one hand, to
asses the validity of the control group (i.e. using unregulated drugs within
the same ATC group as a counter-factual), we test if the selection of drugs
into the treatment group is endogenous or responds to price changes. To
do this, we perform a linear regression analysis that evaluates whether, in
any of the periods prior to the implementation of the regulation scheme, the
variation in the natural logarithm of prices can be explained by the change
in the variable that indicates the treatment selection (Di), after controlling
for time effects and the previously described vector of control variables (HHI,
the generic drug dummy and the US Dollar exchange rate).
The estimates of this regression model, presented in Table 5, indicate
that the prices in the market do not correlate with the likelihood of the drug
being assigned to the control group. All except one of the coefficients of
the interactions between the treatment indicator and period indicator is not
statistically different from zero. Thus, we are confident selection into the
treatment group is not endogenous, at least for the drugs in the 18 ATC
groups included in the study.
On the other hand, to further test the validity of the chosen control
group, a falsification test is carried out using only the sample of non-regulated
drugs. In this test, we estimate a linear regression model where the dependent
variable is the logarithm of average prices, and the independent variables are
the dummy variable Tit, the HHI, the dummy for generic drugs, and fixed
effects of time and drugs. The results of this exercise, presented in Table
6, show that the coefficient associated to Tit is not statistically significant,
suggesting that entry of the regulatory scheme does not have an effect on the
average price trend for unregulated group drugs. This result suggests that
the control group is correctly specified in the sense that there is no apparent
treatment effect on the price trend of unregulated drugs.
The main results of the impact evaluation exercise are organized in Table
7. Column 1 presents the results of a model specification without controls or
20
Table 5: Estimated impact in average prices across regulated and unregulated
drugs, prior to the regulation (with control variables, fixed effect and cluster
of errors)
Log(Price)
Interaction period 2 -0.277 (-1.75)
Interaction period 3 -0.116 (-0.87)
Interaction period 4 -0.0351 (-0.24)
Interaction period 5 -0.146 (-0.53)
Interaction period 6 0.0147 (0.07)
Interaction period 7 0.304 (1.05)
Interaction period 8 0.676* (2.39)
Interaction period 9 0.438 (1.74)
Interaction period 10 0.0500 (0.11)
Interaction period 11 0.332 (1.18)
Interaction period 12 0.0645 (0.22)
Interaction period 13 -0.0516 (-0.20)
Interaction period 14 0.145 (0.52)
Interaction period 15 0.0910 (0.32)
Interaction period 16 0.0782 (0.20)
Interaction period 17 0.169 (0.47)
Interaction period 18 0.0586 (0.17)
Interaction period 19 -0.403 (-1.25)
Interaction period 20 -0.464 (-1.43)
Interaction period 21 -0.380 (-0.96)
Interaction period 22 -0.182 (-0.45)
Interaction period 23 -0.0518 (-0.13)
Interaction period 24 -0.285 (-0.76)
Interaction period 25 0.314 (1.04)
Interaction period 26 0.197 (0.59)
Interaction period 27 0.178 (0.66)
Interaction period 28 -0.314 (-1.08)
Interaction period 29 -0.290 (-0.92)
Interaction period 30 -0.222 (-0.68)
Interaction period 31 0.0874 (0.28)
Interaction period 32 0.148 (0.50)
Interaction period 33 0.144 (0.45)
Interaction period 34 -0.0257 (-0.07)
Interaction period 35 0.0693 (0.19)
Interaction period 36 0.130 (0.37)
Interaction period 37 -0.0139 (-0.04)
Interaction period 38 -0.179 (-0.49)
Interaction period 39 -0.200 (-0.53)





interaction period 40 -0.119 (-0.32)
interaction period 41 -0.352 (-0.85)
interaction period 42 -0.179 (-0.47)
interaction period 43 -0.0997 (-0.26)
interaction period 44 0.0175 (0.05)
interaction period 45 -0.0698 (-0.20)
interaction period 46 -0.119 (-0.36)
interaction period 47 0.475 (1.07)





t-statistics in parenthesis *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Source: SISMED 2011-2014.













Fixed time effect yes
t-statistics in parenthesis
Source: SISMED 2011-2014.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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time fixed effects. The second column presents the estimates of the specifica-
tion including control variables but excluding time effects. Finally, column 3
presents the complete estimation, i.e. the model with control variables and
fixed time effects. We focus our discussion on the direction, magnitude and
significance of the coefficients presented in the last specification.
As shown below, only three of the eighteen coefficients of interest (those
that are associated to the triple interaction between Di, Tt and Gj) are neg-
ative and statistically different from zero. This indicates that for only these
3 ATC groups the PMVP scheme caused a reduction in average prices of
the regulated drugs. Note that the coefficient of interest does not repre-
sent differences in price levels across regulated an unregulated drugs, but
rather differences in price variation after the regulation, across regulated
an unregulated drugs within a particular ATC group. For instance, for
ATC A10AE04 -which corresponds to Glargine Insulin (used for the treat-
ment of Diabetes Mellitus)-, thanks to the price-cap scheme a reduction of
86.8% in prices was achieved, when comparing regulated and unregulated
drugs in this specific ATC group. For ATC L01BC06, which corresponds to
Capecitabine (used for malignant neoplastic diseases and the modulation of
the inmuno-suppressive system), we observe a reduction of 36.2% in average
prices, thanks to the regulation. Similarly, for ATC N06DA03, that corre-
sponds to drugs for the nervous system the estimated impact is a reduction
of 10,4% in average prices.23
It is important to highlight some special characteristics shared by the
ATC groups in which we observe the expected impact of the regulation
scheme (i.e, a price reduction). The three ATC groups include treatments for
catastrophic and high-cost diseases -such as Cancer, Diabetes, Parkinson’s
and Alzheimer’s-. Evidently, one could hypothesize that the corresponding
markets share particular characteristics. For instance, in two of these ATC
groups there is relatively little competition (see columns 7 and 8 of Table 4,
for ATC groups A10AE04 and N06DA03). There is no systematic evidence
that the introduction of the regulation scheme promoted competition within
these ATC groups. On the contrary, as shown in Table 4, competition in-
creased substantially between 2011 and 2014 only within ATC L01BC06 -
23This ATC group corresponds to a presentation of the drug Rivastigmine that is used to
treat cognitive deficit related to Alzheimer’s disease and dementia associated Parkinson’s
disease.
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while relatively low levels of competition are persistent in time. These de-
scriptive statistics suggest that, precisely because of low competition levels
and the specificity of catastrophic and high-cost disease treatments (where
prices were especially high), the price-cap regulation effectively led to a re-
duction in the average prices (below the equilibrium price of the respective
markets).
Moreover, the coefficient estimates presented in Table 7 also show that
this regulation scheme led to a statistically significant increase in average
prices in ten out of the eighteen ATC groups we study. To better illustrate
this unexpected result, we showcase three particular pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The first one is a ”coagulation factor” called Factor VIII -used to
treat hemophilia-, classified into ATC group B02BD02, which is of special
interest given that it represents the lion’s share of total sales in the study’s
sample of pharmaceutical products. In particular, the observed importance
of this ATC group in total sales is explained mainly by its relatively high
price, and not by the quantities sold. For this ATC group, our estimates
show an increase of 71.5% in the average prices of the regulated medicines,
attributable to the PMVP price-cap regime. For ATC group J01XX08, that
corresponds to the antibiotic Linezolid (used to treat bacterial diseases), we
observe an increase of 33.3% in prices. Similarly, for ATC group L01AX03
-corresponding to Temozolomide, an anti-neoplastic chemotherapy drug-, the
impact of the regulation was an increase of 91% in average prices.
We hypothesize that these results are explained by a convergence effect:
within an ATC group, prices could gravitate towards a price-cap that was
higher than the market equilibrium price (observed prior to the introduction
of the regulation). In other words, when the scheme introduces a price-cap
that is higher than the free-market price, the price-cap works as a reference
point to which firms have clear incentives to converge to. Thus, the PMVP
scheme led to and unexpected and unwanted effect in these particular ten
ATC groups, for which firms ended up reacting to the policy by increasing
drug prices to a marginally lower level than the price-cap.24
24A simple descriptive analysis shows that, for the aforementioned ten ATC groups, we
observe that the price-cap is relatively high, and that it does not affect the market directly
by setting an effective maximum price cap that forces a generalized drop in prices (see
Appendix A).
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Table 7: DDD estimation with fixed time effect and error clusters.
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
D=1*A10AE04*t=1 -1.595∗∗∗ -1.211∗∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0384) (0.114)
D=1*B02BD02*t=1 0.428∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0393) (0.0774)
D=1*H02AB04*t=1 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.0632
(4.86e-13) (0.0102) (0.0613)
D=1*J01DH02*t=1 -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.0794
(4.86e-13) (0.0362) (0.0561)
D=1*J01XX08*t=1 0.130∗∗∗ -0.00676 0.333∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0160) (0.0508)
D=1*L01AX03*t=1 0.831∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0222) (0.0604)
D=1*L01BC06*t=1 0.402∗∗∗ 0.116 -0.362∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.111) (0.0822)
D=1*L02BB03*t=1 0.00574∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0231) (0.0662)
D=1*L03AB07*t=1 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0586∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0123) (0.0443)
D=1*L04AA06*t=1 0.0490∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0183) (0.0676)
D=1*L04AD01*t=1 -0.111∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.00490
(4.86e-13) (0.0103) (0.0573)
D=1*L04AD02*t=1 0.600∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.00792) (0.0752)
D=1*N03AX14*t=1 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ 0.151∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0132) (0.0715)
D=1*N03AX16*t=1 -0.168∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ 0.0334
(4.86e-13) (0.00820) (0.0614)
D=1*N04BC05*t=1 -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗ 0.229∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0850) (0.112)
D=1*N05AH04*t=1 0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0183) (0.0521)
D=1*N06DA03*t=1 0.302∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ -0.104∗
(4.89e-13) (0.00780) (0.0503)
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DDD estimation with fixed time effect and error clusters - bis
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
Intercept 4.244∗∗∗ 4.571∗∗∗ 5.195∗∗∗
(6.52e-13) (0.0927) (0.140)
Observations 37548 37548 37548
Number of drugs 2422 2422 2422
R2 (with-in) 0.0657 0.1064 0.24
R2 (overall) 0.2033 0.2216 0.3114
Time fixed effect No No yes
Controls No yes yes
Stand errors in parentesis
Source: SISMED 2011-2014, MSPS
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This result is consistent with the findings of Danzon et al. (1996), but
apparently contradicts the evidence presented by Brekke et al. (2007) for
Norway. We believe these contradictory results can be explained by the fact
that, in Norway, the price of all drugs within an ATC group were regulated.
This meant that, in this country the regulation was intended to cap all prices
(within an ATC group), and probably eliminated any space for price-setting
strategic behavior.
Finally, it is important to highlight that our economic model explains
31% of the overall variation in prices, and approximately 24% of the varia-
tion within ATC groups. Also, it should be noted that the coefficient associ-
ated with the dummy indicating that a drug is brand-named is statistically
significant and positive, which coincides with the literature in which it is
widely documented that these drugs are relatively more expensive (when
compared to generic drugs). For this reason, these brand-name drugs are
more frequently targeted by regulation frameworks. Indeed, in our analyt-
ical sample we find proportionally more regulated brand-name drugs. As
mentioned before, by including this dummy variable we hope to control for
the pre-existing differences in the distribution of generic versus brand-name
drugs among treatment and control groups.25
25Additionally, we perform additional regression analyses to show that there is a dif-
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As an approximation to the overall economic impact of the price-cap
implementation, we do a back-of-the-envelope estimation of the net value of
drug sales and expenditure, resulting from the changes in prices attributable
to the PVMP scheme. In this calculation we use the observed quantities sold
during November 2012 - the last month in which none of the drugs included
in the study were regulated. We observe that, in this particular month, total
sales from the eighteen ATC groups in our sample represented approximately
USD 126 million. We estimate that the net economic impact of the price-
cap regime on prices implied an increase of 30% in the value of the monthly
sales. This means that, if the regulation was implemented in the baseline
month (November 2012), total sales would have reached USD 164 million
(see Table 8). It is important to highlight that the estimated net economic
impact is actually a higher bound, since this static methodology does not
consider relevant mechanisms that could mitigate this impact. For instance,
even in a very inelastic market, strategic behavior by the firms could result
in the reduction of prices of unregulated drugs to avoid future regulations.
From our results, we are able to suggest the specific adjustments to the
design of the price-cap regulation. First, price-caps should be lower in ATC
groups that represent the lion’s share in total sales, or that evidenced a
price increase after the price-cap regulation implementation. For instance,
ATC groups L04AA06, L04AD02 and N03AX14, which represent 41%, 21%
and 22% of total sales in our analytic sample, respectively. Second, for the
specific cases in which drugs show extremely high increases (e.g., B02BD02,
L01AX03, L04AD02 and J01XX08) a much deeper analysis is required to
fully understand the market structure, incentives and strategic behaviors
from the pharmaceutical firms. These two types of urgent intervention cases
are clearly identifiable in Figure 3.
ferential impact of the regulation on drugs, according to whether they are brand-name
or generic. We find that, in average, prices in ATC groups B02BD02 and L04AD02 fell
125% and 43,5%, respectively. These results are statistically significant with type I error
probabilities of 1% and 5%, respectively.
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Table 8: Monthly sales observed (November 2012) and projected; and price-
cap regulation impact
ATC Observed (USD) Projected (USD) Impact
A02BC05 40,085 40,085 0%
A10AE04 1,859,800 245,494 -87%
B02BD02 140,509 240,972 72%
H02AB04 43,134 43,134 0%
J01DH02 2,094,822 2,094,822 0%
J01XX08 304,309 405,643 33%
L01AX03 2,127,354 4,063,247 91%
L01BC06 1,946,603 1,241,933 -36%
L02BB03 396,926 490,997 24%
L03AB07 2,910,334 3,472,028 19%
L04AA06 52,189,930 64,767,703 24%
L04AD01 548,317 548,317 0%
L04AD02 26,841,376 47,267,663 76%
N03AX14 27,074,165 31,162,364 15%
N03AX16 2,084,758 2,084,758 0%
N04BC05 1,679,319 2,063,883 23%
N05AH04 2,693,231 3,105,296 15%
N06DA03 985,094 882,644 -10%
Total 125,960,065 164,220,982 30%
Notes: Observed sales correspond to the total value of sales in November 2012.
Projected monthly sales are estimated using average price changes by ATC
group, obtained from the of the preferred econometric model specification.
Source: SISMED November 2012, MSPS
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Figure 2: Monthly sales observed (November 2012) and projected; and price-
cap regulation impact
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Pharmaceutical markets exhibit a particular structure, usually described by
limited competition, differentiated products, and the inelasticity of demand.
These conditions have led countries, to implement diverse regulatory schemes
to control sale prices, protect the consumer, contain government expenditures
and ensure the sustainability of health insurance systems. Using an econo-
metric estimation of triple differences, this study evaluates the impact of
a price-cap regulation scheme implemented during the period 2011-2014 in
Colombia. The results of this empirical estimation indicate that, in addi-
tion to having only met its objective of reducing prices in just three ATC
groups, this regulation had the unexpected and unwanted effect of an average
increase in the prices in ten ATC groups.
On the one hand, it should be noted that the price-cap regime succeeded
in reducing the prices of drugs used for high-cost and catastrophic diseases
such as Cancer, Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s. This is a particularly impor-
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tant result, since in Colombia high-cost and catastrophic disease patients are
subject to special protection from health and financial risks through specially
designed public policy mechanisms. Similarly, the regulation caused a reduc-
tion in the average price of drugs used to treat Diabetes, which is itself a
precursor to high-cost diseases that, in addition of the cost and suffering of
patients and their families, they represent a substantial financial burden for
the health insurance system.
On the other hand, it is also true that most of the pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in the ten ATC groups for which the average prices increased thanks to
the price-cap regulation, are associated to the treatment of high-cost or catas-
trophic diseases. Without a doubt, this increase in prices has contributed
significantly to an imbalance in the Nation’s budget and compromises the
capacity of the social security system to guarantee the rights of these pa-
tients.
Further research is needed to fully understand how the regulation impacts
competition and, specifically, the entry of generic drugs to the medicines mar-
ket. Existing literature shows that, in different regulatory systems, market
participation of generic drugs has increased (Aronsson et al., 2001; Dalen et
al., 2006; Brekke et al., 2011; Brekke et al., 2015). Furthermore, evidence
suggests that reference price systems have a negative effect on the entry of
brand-name drugs (Brekke et al., 2009).26 Bardey et al. (2016a) develop a
theoretical model to analyze how me-too drugs generate competition within
a therapeutic class when regulation by reference prices is applied. While this
research focuses on a price-cap scheme -and not reference prices-, their re-
sults show competition dynamics depend on the market structure within the
therapeutic groups, which corroborates the premise that there is competition
within ATC groups. However, the time period of this study does not them
to fully investigate the dynamics of market structures.
26According to Brekke et al. (2009), the reference price scheme increases the number
of generics and their participation in the market, and reduces the prices of all drugs.
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Figure 3: Time line of legal reforms




CNPM Design of the methodology for direct price
control regime and implementation of
price-cap regieme (PMV) for some drugs.
Circular 04 of
2013
CNPM 189 medicamentos included into the




CNPM Modification of PMVP for 189 regulated
drugs by circular 04 of 2013. 23 medica-
mentos included in the PMVP scheme.
Modification of price for 9 drugs in VMR
scheme defined by Circular 04 of 2013.
Circular 06 of
2013
CNPM Three drugs (KALETRA) included in
PMVP scheme du to their high impact.
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2013
CNPM 364 drugs included in PMVP scheme and
252 drugs included in VMR scheme.
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2014
CNPM 285 drugs included in PMVP scheme.
Source: Circulars and Decrees published by MSPS and CNPM.
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DDD estimation with time and ATC fixed effect. Standard errors clusters
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
D=1 0.333∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0344) (0.0722)
A10AE04 0.688∗∗∗ 0.296 1.120∗
(6.54e-13) (0.587) (0.504)
B02BD02 0.128∗∗∗ -0.396 0.107
(6.57e-13) (0.254) (0.196)
H02AB04 0.278∗∗∗ 0.0390 0.533∗∗∗
(6.65e-13) (0.0439) (0.196)
J01DH02 -0.0637∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗ 0.225
(6.52e-13) (0.0745) (0.120)
J01XX08 2.704∗∗∗ 2.602∗∗∗ 2.885∗∗∗
(6.54e-13) (0.0347) (0.0677)
L01AX03 2.249∗∗∗ 1.110 1.893∗∗∗
(6.54e-13) (0.613) (0.464)
L01BC06 0.623∗∗∗ -0.431 -0.180
(6.53e-13) (0.578) (0.424)
L02BB03 1.311∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗
(6.53e-13) (0.229) (0.184)
L03AB07 3.268∗∗∗ 2.769∗∗∗ 2.847∗∗∗
(6.57e-13) (0.225) (0.151)
L04AA06 1.951∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗
(6.55e-13) (0.247) (0.187)
L04AD01 0.326∗∗∗ -0.168 0.296
(6.52e-13) (0.343) (0.277)
L04AD02 2.825∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗∗
(6.54e-13) (0.424) (0.340)
N03AX14 0.795∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗
(6.53e-13) (0.0444) (0.0806)
N03AX16 0.271∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗
(6.53e-13) (0.0346) (0.0919)
N04BC05 1.713∗∗∗ 0.844∗ 1.600∗∗∗
(6.53e-13) (0.420) (0.352)
N05AH04 0.413∗∗∗ 0.201 0.624∗∗∗
(6.64e-13) (0.162) (0.162)
N06DA03 1.635∗∗∗ 1.188∗ 1.222∗∗
(6.59e-13) (0.590) (0.463)
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DDD estimation with time and ATC fixed effect. Standard errors clusters
bis
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
D=1*A10AE04 1.527∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0630) (0.160)
D=1*B02BD02 -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0911 -0.473∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0838) (0.131)
D=1*H02AB04 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.119
(1.58e-11) (0.0259) (0.0613)
D=1*J01DH02 -0.577∗∗∗ 0.0488 -0.291∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0882) (0.0871)
D=1*J01XX08 -0.313∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0804) (0.108)
D=1*L01AX03 0.266∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.117∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0333) (0.0489)
D=1*L01BC06 -0.276∗∗∗ 0.0105 0.380∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.110) (0.0659)
D=1*L02BB03 0.619∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0327) (0.0650)
D=1*L03AB07 -0.0880∗∗∗ 0.00847 -0.0559
(1.58e-11) (0.0308) (0.0671)
D=1*L04AA06 -1.822∗∗∗ -1.694∗∗∗ -2.049∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0362) (0.0747)
D=1*L04AD01 -0.963∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗ -1.260∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0115) (0.0704)
D=1*L04AD02 -0.825∗∗∗ -0.820∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0396) (0.0752)
D=1*N03AX14 -0.810∗∗∗ -0.824∗∗∗ -1.177∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0238) (0.0756)
D=1*N03AX16 1.049∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.00891) (0.0846)
D=1*N04BC05 -0.634∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.841∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0880) (0.108)
D=1*N05AH04 0.483∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.157∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0206) (0.0773)
D=1*N06DA03 -1.120∗∗∗ -1.526∗∗∗ -1.272∗∗∗
(1.58e-11) (0.0475) (0.115)
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DDD estimation with time and ATC fixed effect. Standard errors clusters
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
t=1 -1.294∗∗∗ -1.456∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0157) (0.105)
D=1*t=1 0.130∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ -0.00187
(4.86e-13) (0.0169) (0.0590)
A10AE04*t=1 0.411∗∗∗ 0.0411 -0.241∗
(2.35e-13) (0.0408) (0.102)
B02BD02*t=1 0.942∗∗∗ 1.284∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.127) (0.121)
H02AB04*t=1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(2.35e-13) (0.0157) (0.0758)
J01DH02*t=1 1.307∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.00534) (0.0745)
J01XX08*t=1 0.787∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0134) (0.0489)
L01AX03*t=1 -0.0769∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(2.36e-13) (0.0347) (0.0475)
L01BC06*t=1 0.576∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗
(2.35e-13) (0.223) (0.164)
L02BB03*t=1 0.663∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0484) (0.0851)
L03AB07*t=1 1.369∗∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗
(2.35e-13) (0.0604) (0.0600)
L04AA06*t=1 0.347∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0991) (0.102)
L04AD01*t=1 0.719∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0316) (0.0595)
L04AD02*t=1 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗
(2.35e-13) (0.00538) (0.0561)
N03AX14*t=1 0.541∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.197∗
(2.34e-13) (0.0703) (0.0959)
N03AX16*t=1 1.378∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.00880) (0.0959)
N04BC05*t=1 1.377∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗
(2.34e-13) (0.177) (0.164)
N05AH04*t=1 0.739∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(2.37e-13) (0.0693) (0.0861)
N06DA03*t=1 -0.365∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ 0.0742
(2.38e-13) (0.00599) (0.0553)
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DDD estimation with time and ATC fixed effect. Standard errors clusters
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
D=1*A10AE04*t=1 -1.595∗∗∗ -1.211∗∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0384) (0.114)
D=1*B02BD02*t=1 0.428∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0393) (0.0774)
D=1*H02AB04*t=1 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.0632
(4.86e-13) (0.0102) (0.0613)
D=1*J01DH02*t=1 -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.0794
(4.86e-13) (0.0362) (0.0561)
D=1*J01XX08*t=1 0.130∗∗∗ -0.00676 0.333∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0160) (0.0508)
D=1*L01AX03*t=1 0.831∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0222) (0.0604)
D=1*L01BC06*t=1 0.402∗∗∗ 0.116 -0.362∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.111) (0.0822)
D=1*L02BB03*t=1 0.00574∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0231) (0.0662)
D=1*L03AB07*t=1 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0586∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0123) (0.0443)
D=1*L04AA06*t=1 0.0490∗∗∗ -0.0826∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0183) (0.0676)
D=1*L04AD01*t=1 -0.111∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.00490
(4.86e-13) (0.0103) (0.0573)
D=1*L04AD02*t=1 0.600∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(4.86e-13) (0.00792) (0.0752)
D=1*N03AX14*t=1 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ 0.151∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0132) (0.0715)
D=1*N03AX16*t=1 -0.168∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ 0.0334
(4.86e-13) (0.00820) (0.0614)
D=1*N04BC05*t=1 -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗ 0.229∗
(4.86e-13) (0.0850) (0.112)
D=1*N05AH04*t=1 0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(4.87e-13) (0.0183) (0.0521)
D=1*N06DA03*t=1 0.302∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ -0.104∗
(4.89e-13) (0.00780) (0.0503)
Constant 4.244∗∗∗ 4.571∗∗∗ 5.195∗∗∗
(6.52e-13) (0.0927) (0.140)
Observations 37548 37548 37548
Standard errors in parenthesis
Source: SISMED 2011-2014, MSPS
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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